Tuesday, June 26, 2007

Remember: The Victim Asked For It

This reads like something out of a feminist diatribe about the evil old days of the 1950s. Except it is from that progressive liberal utopia of Britain:
A PEDOPHILE who raped a 10-year-old girl will be free in just four months after a British judge said his victim had "dressed provocatively".

Window cleaner Keith Fenn, 24, could have been jailed for life after twice attacking the girl in a riverside park.

Judge Julian Hall was at the centre of a storm over the "pathetic" sentence he imposed after hearing the girl had appeared much older than her age.

The same judge caused uproar earlier this year by setting free another paedophile and telling him to give his victim money "to buy a nice new bicycle".

In the latest case, Oxford Crown Court heard harrowing details of the assault on the 10-year-old. She was attacked in a park in South Oxfordshire by Fenn and his accomplice Darren Wright, 34, on October 14 last year.

Fenn removed all her clothes and raped her, then Wright took her to his home and sexually assaulted her.

Yet Judge Hall said the case was exceptional because the "young woman" had been wearing a frilly bra and thong.

The girl has been in local authority care since the age of four.

She was on her own when she met the pair in the street. They went to the park together. The judge said he faced a moral dilemma.

The court heard that the girl regularly wore make-up, strappy tops and jeans.

"It is quite clear she is a very disturbed child and a very needy child and she is a sexually precocious child. She liked to dress provocatively," the judge said.

"Did she look like she was 10? Certainly not. She looked 16."

He gave Fenn concurrent two-year and 18-month sentences but he will be free in just weeks after spending eight months in jail awaiting sentence.

Wright is a free man because he too had served eight months on remand.
The Poisoned Well

I was at first a little surprised at the number of people who have been finding some nefarious and dastardly plot in H.R. 2640. I am no fan of the gun control crowd, and I look pretty carefully at whatever scheme they come up with, because I am not terribly trusting of their good intentions. Still, I read the various criticisms of H.R. 2640, and I just don't see that it fundamentally puts gun rights at risk, except for the relatively small number of people who have been involuntarily committed to a mental hospital. Thanks largely to the ACLU, involuntary commitment (as opposed to being held for observation) is really quite difficult in the United States, and has been for a couple of decades.

So why is there this profound mistrust of not only H.R. 2640, but also of the NRA, for backing it? A friend of mine, Don Kates, who is the elder scholar of the gun rights movement in America, describes the net effect of the gun control movement's continuing efforts to disarm law-abiding people as "poisoning the well." They have created so much mistrust that even when they come together with the NRA on what should be an uncontroversial bill, there is an assumption that if the gun control crowd is for it, it has to have a dark, incredibly subtle underside to it.

Let's get straight about this: H.R. 2640 doesn't really change who is prohibited from owning a gun. The rules about those who have been adjudicated mentally incompetent not being allowed to own a gun have been in place since the Gun Control Act of 1968. If anything, H.R. 2640 is an improvement on the current system, because it provides an appeal mechanism for those who were wrongly declared mentally incompetent in the past. What it changes is the requirement for states to report this information to the federal government. Argue if you want that there's a privacy issue here, or a federalism issue, but this really isn't changing who is prohibited from owning a gun.

The gun control movement, for many years, has put most of its focus not only disarming criminals, or the mentally ill, or kids, but on disarming law-abiding adults. Hence, the assault weapons bans, the attempts to sue handgun makers out of business, and so on. The net effect has been to create an enormous body of mistrust. I know that I will never really trust the good intentions of the gun control movement precisely because it does have this dishonest history. I will always look over their claims and proposals with a concern about what they might be hiding. But I've done this with H.R. 2640, as has NRA, and there's nothing terribly dangerous about this bill.

Monday, June 25, 2007

Why Some Things Can't Be Said At Work

Imagine that a government employer threatened an employee with termination for putting a flyer on an employee bulletin board for an "alternative" lifestyle--while allowing groups promoting traditional lifestyles to put up their materials. Equal protection violation, right? Narrow-minded religious bigots at it again, right? You just know that the mainstream media would be clucking up a storm.

But because the employees threatened with discipline were promoting "one man, one woman"--you won't hear much about this. There's a bit of discussion of it online, and in a few newspapers. George Will, for example:
Marriage is the foundation of the natural family and sustains family values. That sentence is inflammatory, perhaps even a hate crime.

At least it is in Oakland, Calif. That city's government says those words, italicized here, constitute something akin to hate speech and can be proscribed from the government's open e-mail system and employee bulletin board.

When the McCain-Feingold law empowered government to regulate the quantity, content and timing of political campaign speech about government, it was predictable that the right of free speech would increasingly be sacrificed to various social objectives that free speech supposedly impedes. And it was predictable that speech suppression would become an instrument of cultural combat, used to settle ideological scores and advance political agendas by silencing adversaries.

That has happened in Oakland. And, predictably, the ineffable U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit has ratified this abridgement of First Amendment protections. Fortunately, overturning the 9th Circuit is steady work for the U.S. Supreme Court.

Some African American Christian women working for Oakland's government organized the Good News Employee Association (GNEA), which they announced with a flier describing their group as "a forum for people of Faith to express their views on the contemporary issues of the day. With respect for the Natural Family, Marriage and Family Values."

The flier was distributed after other employees' groups, including those advocating gay rights, had advertised their political views and activities on the city's e-mail system and bulletin board. When the GNEA asked for equal opportunity to communicate by that system and that board, it was denied. Furthermore, the flier they posted was taken down and destroyed by city officials, who declared it "homophobic" and disruptive.
GNEA filed suit claiming that their right to free speech was denied because they were warned against putting up flyers in
public view which contained statements of a homophobic nature and were determined to promote sexual orientation based harassment,” and noted that violation of AI 71 could result in “discipline up to and including termination.”
The federal district court decision (which is here) makes the claim that there isn't really much of a dispute to argue. On the one hand, the trial judge claimed that the plaintiffs (GNEA) weren't much injured:
On plaintiffs’ side of the balance is their interest in speaking. This interest is slight, as the restriction placed on their speech under the facts at bar was quite limited: Plaintiffs were prohibited from posting a particular flyer on an office bulletin board. Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge that no restriction has been placed on their speech outside of work (by, for example, threatening them with termination if they speak outside the workplace). They further acknowledge that they can discuss their views with co-workers as they wish at appropriate times (at lunch, on a break).
I can't argue the point. I agree with those who argue that an employer has a right to limit employee speech. If the guy at McDonald's doesn't want to say, "Would you like to SuperSize that?" he doesn't have to keep working there. In practice, of course, this recognition of an employer's rights works to the benefit of homosexuals, because large corporations are overwhelmingly run by liberals and leftists; that's part of why almost all employers bend over forwards to make homosexuals feel welcome--and force everyone else to smile vacantly if the subject comes up.

I can even agree with the concern about the potential for workplace disruption, for which the trial judge relied on a U.S. Supreme Court decision, Pickering v. Board of Education (1968). Reading Pickering, however, it is hard to imagine that the ACLU would be happy about it--the Supreme Court upheld a school board firing a teacher for writing a letter to the newspaper criticizing the school board's handling of finances. This is a far different situation than GNEA's suit involved. In some respects, GNEA had a weaker position than Pickering did. Pickering lost his job for actions that took place completely away from work; GNEA was challenging actions that were definitely in the workplace.

The trial judge not only felt that GNEA didn't have much of a claim to a right to use the bulletin board, but also agreed that there wasn't much to the employer's claim that it had a good reason to do what it did:

Defendants’ countervailing interest is also modest. As the court’s recitation of the law makes clear, workplace disruption is the touchstone of the employer’s interest in the Pickering balance. Here, there is no dispute that Rederford and Christy’s co-worker Jennings disturbed dispute that removal of the flyer was the direct result of the investigation of Jennings’ complaint. But whether the particular sensitivity of a single coworker amounts to cognizable workplace disruption under Pickering is far from clear. Furthermore, the bulk of Jennings’ disquiet appears to have stemmed from her conversation with Rederford, an event that may have been precipitated by the flyer, but was nonetheless separate from the flyer. That said, the flyer appears to have been the root of a dust-up of sorts in the office -- a Pickering disruption writ small.
If GNEA's dispute was with a private employer, this would be a slam dunk decision in favor of a private employer. As I said, I'm not impressed with the claim that there's some overpowering right to say whatever you feel like at work--even if you are a government employee. But because there is a government employer involved, I do think there's a legitimate claim that GNEA has for equal protection of the law.

GNEA was not allowed to put a flyer up on the bulletin board--and they were warned that while they could use the email system to announce the existence of their group, it was subject to editorial restrictions intended to avoid offending homosexuals. Obviously, when homosexual groups use employer resources to send out their materials, they don't have to worry about being censored to avoid offending straights. In theory, sure, but in practice, I can't imagine that the City of Oakland would even think of suggesting that a gay group's announcement of National Coming Out Day would offend GNEA's members--and maybe they shouldn't send it.

What is really the most significant part of this, however, is how incredibly sensitive some people are:

The flyer came to the attention of Judith Jennings (“Jennings”), a lesbian employee in CEDA who used the copy machine near which the flyer was posted. Jennings Decl (Doc #41) ¶6; Melaugh Decl (Doc #43) Ex A (Rederford Depo) at 130:21-131:6. Jennings felt “targeted” and “excluded.” Jennings Decl (Doc #41) ¶7. Shortly after seeing the flyer, Jennings spoke with Rederford, whose name and phone number (along with Christy’s) appeared on the flyer. Id ¶8. This conversation left Jennings “feeling anxious about working in the same office as [plaintiffs]” and she “could not believe that [she] worked with someone who condemned homosexuals like [her] so much.” Id ¶9.
In essence, Jennings pulled the levers of power to remind these two women in the office that their disapproval of homosexuality was less important than Jennings' disapproval of their disapproval. In short, when there is a conflict of values, instead of acting like a grown-up, and agreeing to disagree, she decided that her emotional problems required the heavy hand of the government come down on the GNEA.
Not the Same Neeraj Gulati

I mentioned last week that a Neeraj Gulati
was wanted for rape in India. According to Ciena, it's not the same Neeraj Gulati who is a VP of Ciena. Here's the Interpol flyer for the guy wanted in India; this appears to be the VP of Ciena by that name. They sure don't look like the same guy to me.
Oh Horrors! Religious Imagery!

This decision by the U.S. Supreme Court involves the question of whether individual taxpayers may sue for violations of the religious establishment clause. As the Court's decision explains:
It has long been established,however,that the payment of taxes is generally not enough to establish standing to challenge an action taken by the Federal Government. In light of the size of the federal budget,it is a complete fiction to argue that an unconstitutional federal expenditure causes an individual federal taxpayer any measurable economic harm. And if every federal taxpayer could sue to challenge any Government expenditure, the federal courts would cease to function as courts of law and would be cast in the role of general complaint bureaus.
What was the specific complaint here? Did the government give special favored status to a particular church? Did they provide funding to a church to propagate the Gospel? No:
This is a lawsuit in which it was claimed that conferences held as part of the President ’s Faith-Based and Community Initiatives program violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because, among other things, President Bush and former Secretary of Education Paige gave speeches that used “religious imagery” and praised the efficacy of faith-based programs in delivering social services.
Oh yes, clearly, the Framers would have strongly objected to the use of "religious imagery." To quote from the Second Contintental Congress:
The Congress, therefore, considering the warlike preparations of the British Ministry to subvert our invaluable rights and priviledges, and to reduce us by fire and sword, by the savages of the wilderness, and our own domestics, to the most abject and ignominious bondage: Desirous, at the same time, to have people of all ranks and degrees duly impressed with a solemn sense of God's superintending providence, and of their duty, devoutly to rely, in all their lawful enterprizes, on his aid and direction, Do earnestly recommend, that Friday, the Seventeenth day of May next, be observed by the said colonies as a day of humiliation, fasting, and prayer; that we may, with united hearts, confess and bewail our manifold sins and transgressions, and, by a sincere repentance and amendment of life, appease his righteous displeasure, and, through the merits and mediation of Jesus Christ, obtain his pardon and forgiveness; humbly imploring his assistance to frustrate the cruel purposes of our unnatural enemies; and by inclining their hearts to justice and benevolence, prevent the further effusion of kindred blood. [Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, Saturday, March 16, 1776, pp. 208-209]
Unsurprisingly, the left end of the Court, Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, disagreed, and managed to demonstrate their inability to read what they wrote:

We held in Flast, and repeated just last Term, that the “‘injury’ alleged in Establishment Clause challenges to federal spending ” is “the very ‘extract[ion] and spen[ding]’ of ‘tax money’ in aid of religion..” ... As the Court said in Flast, the importance of that type of injury has deep historical roots going back to the ideal of religious liberty in James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,that the government in a free society may not “force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment” of religion.
They seem to have missed something: Madison was writing against tax funding of establishments of religion:
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? that the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?
The use of religions imagery and praise for religiously based social programs is hardly funding of establishments of religion.

Even worse--even if the claim that this support of faith-based social programs (which liberals love if these programs are operated by say, the Urban League or the NAACP) is funding religion in some way were true, the dissenting opinion is historically wrong:
Here, there is no dispute that taxpayer money in identifiable amounts is funding conferences, and these are alleged to have the purpose of promoting religion. Cf. Doremus v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S.429, 434 (1952). The taxpayers therefore seek not to “extend” Flast, ante ,at 24 (plurality opinion), but merely to apply it. When executive agencies spend identifiable sums of tax money for religious purposes, no less than when Congress authorizes the same thing, taxpayers suffer injury.
As I point out here, early Congressional actions demonstrate that they didn't see the First Amendment as a barrier to direct federal support of religion--even funding religious establishments on a township by township level. Congress reserved section 29 of each township in Ohio for the support of religion. See American State Papers, House of Representatives, 11th Congress, 3rd Session, Public Lands: Volume 2, p. 220, document 187:
It appears to the committee, by the statement of the petitioners, that the third township of the eighth range in the Ohio Company's purchase is a fractional township, being intersected near the centre by the boundary line that separates the track purchased from the donation tract conveyed to the said company; that the said fractional township does not contain the section No. 29, set apart for the support of religion in the several townships in the said purchase, whereby the inhabitants are deprived of the benefit of the ministerial lands.
As late as 1833, you find Congressional bills that make reference to this, such as HR 653, 22nd Cong., 2nd sess.
To authorize the Legislature of the State of Ohio to sell the land reserved for the support of religion in the Ohio Company....
This seems to be the bill that created this, from Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 1789-1873, December 30, 1801:
Mr. Tracy gave notice that he should, to-morrow, ask leave to bring in a bill to carry into effect the appropriations of lands in the purchase of the Ohio company, in the northwestern territory, for the support of schools and religion, and for other purposes.
From what I have read, each township would vote on which denomination was to receive the benefits of sales of land from section 29, so majority will, within the township, effectively created an establishment of religion.
Good News: Political Speech is Again Protected Free Speech!

Back in the February 1, 2004 Shotgun News
, I wrote an article about why the Supreme Court couldn't be trusted. I mentioned specifically their decision in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003), in which the Supreme Court decided that a federal law that prohibited political advertising within 60 days of a general election did not violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. Yet the Court had previously decided that virtual child pornography, tobacco advertising, and flag burning, were all protected by the First Amendment!

You can argue if you like that the Framers wouldn't have had a problem with flag burning or tobacco advertising as protected free speech. But political speech? That is the core expression that the free speech clause was supposed to protect.

Fortunately, the Court's occupants are not forever, and Justice O'Connor is not there anymore. Today, in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (2006), a 5-4 decision nibbled away at this outrageous censorship of political advocacy advertising, allowing advocacy groups to again run ads within 60 days of a general election that name specific candidates.
H.R. 2640: I Still Don't See It

I mentioned a few days ago a WorldNetDaily article, largely relying on a Gun Owners of America alert, that claims that H.R. 2640 would allow all sorts of people to be prohibited from owning a gun. Larry Pratt at Gun Owners of America has expanded on his explanation:
"The critics do not seem to have read our alerts. Please go to which gives an overview. It contains a link which takes one to the supporting documentation: . In that documentation are the BATFE regulations that would be codified by HR 2640. The "adjudication" can be done by any court (at least that should have due process), commission, committee or other authority. The other authority is spelled out in Section 3 where the regs are codified. That's where the psychiatrist is lurking.

You can indeed have your 2nd Amendment rights taken away with the stroke of a pen on a prescription pad.

We hope to have an alert out Monday to show how this lawless approach deprived a gun owner of his rights in Pennsylvania. The DA called the police to have a fellow involuntarily committed so his gun rights would be taken away. The DA and the police acted as an "other authority" of HR 2640.

I wish the critics were right. This is THE WORST gun control bill."

Larry Pratt
Executive Director
Gun Owners of America
http://www.gunowners.org/
I'm still not seeing it. GOA has reproduced a letter from BATF concerning this matter, and it quotes the appropriate federal regulations:

ADJUDICATED AS A MENTAL DEFECTIVE

1. A determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority that a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, or mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease:
1. Is a danger to himself or to others; or
2. Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs.
2. The term shall include—
1. A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal case; and
2. Those persons found incompetent to stand trial or found not guilty by reason of lack of mental responsibility pursuant to articles 50a and 72b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 850a, 876b.


Here's what GOA says:

Anti-gun advocates have tried to create the impression in the media that "other lawful authority" means some judicial or quasi-judicial forum. But nothing in either the regulations or in BATFE's letter of May 9 says or implies this. "Authority" could be:

* A school psychologist to whom "behaviorally challenged" kids are referred;

* A psychiatrist commissioned by Medicare to evaluate seniors for Alzheimer's (an interpretation which is reinforced by the fact that such a finding by such a person is legally effectual for qualifying such a person for Alzheimer's grants);

* A Veteran's Administration psychiatrist who evaluates returning soldiers for post-traumatic stress disorder (large numbers of these names have already been turned over to the FBI by the Clinton administration);

* A psychologist who, under provisions of law, involuntarily commits a patient with no due process at all.

A fortiori, the same person whose findings are enough to "adjudicate" a person as a "mental defective" are equally capable of being able to legally "commit" the person under the second disqualifying clause, within the terms of the statute.


There's nothing in the BATF letter that even hints at these, and as GOA admits, the BATF letter is quite clear on this:

For purposes of a Federal firearms disability, ATF interprets “adjudicated mental defective” to include anyone adjudicated to be a “danger to him or herself,” “a danger to others,” or lacking “the mental capacity to contract or manage their own affairs.” For purposes of Federal law, “danger” means any danger, not simply “imminent” or “substantial” danger as is often required to sustain an involuntary commitment under State law. Thus, for example, adjudication that a person was mentally ill and a danger to himself or others would result in Federal firearms disability, whether the court-ordered treatment was on an inpatient or outpatient basis. This is because the adjudication itself (a finding of danger due to mental illness) is sufficient to trigger the disability.

It should be emphasized that whatever adjudication procedure a State employs, the Constitution requires certain guarantees of due process. In order for a particular commitment order to qualify as a prohibiting commitment, ATF historically has required that traditional protections of due process be present, including adequate notice, an opportunity to respond, and a right to counsel. Such protections are important because whether a person has been adjudicated a mental defective or committed to a mental institution, the firearms disability is permanent.
The BATF letter also is quite clear that voluntary hospitalization or being held for observation is not a commitment, and neither is "a stay in a mental institution that never involved any form of adjudication by a lawful authority."

Yes, if a court went ahead and declared that a person was mentally defective because of Alzheimer's, he could be disarmed. But relatively few people are adjudicated as mentally defective because of Alzheimer's--and I would guess that when this happens, it is probably with good reason. The example that Gun Owners of America gives, a psychiatrist evaluating patients--is clearly not a due process adjudication.

The returning veterans concern is something that H.R. 2640 specifically deals with, and corrects--so this is actually a gain for this group.

The school psychologist? What? That's not a due process adjudication--not even close.

I am not aware of ANY state where a psychologist has authority to involuntarily commit a patient "with no due process at all." In general, state laws give substantially more authority to psychiatrists on this count than psychologists, but even psychiatrists don't have this kind of power in any state, to my knowledge.